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 Through private and public efforts, there has been considerable improvement in the health 
and healthcare sector in Nepal. However, the healthcare system in Nepal faces challenges such as 
limited access and lack of quality healthcare. Although there have been recent efforts to introduce 
universal healthcare coverage, there is limited evidence on existing systems to properly formulate 
a policy. To provide a wholistic review of the Nepali health system, we assess both public and 
private sectors.  
 In 2005, Nepal introduced a financial incentive, called the Safe Delivery Incentive Program, 
to increase the use of maternity care with the goal of reducing maternal and neonatal mortality. 
The program included a cash transfer to help with transportation costs, free delivery for mothers 
in certain districts and an incentive for healthcare providers to participate in the delivery. In the 
first paper, we use microdata from the Demographic and Health Surveys (2001 to 2008) and a 
difference-in-differences model to estimate the effect of free delivery, which was only 
implemented for mothers in 25 Nepali districts with the lowest Human Development Index. We 
measure five outcomes: neonatal mortality; prenatal care; prenatal care by doctor; prenatal care by 
nurse/midwife and immunization against neonatal tetanus. The sample consists of 5,317 live births 
 
 
between the years of 2001-2008. We find that women are more likely to get prenatal care from a 
doctor, nurse or midwife and immunization against neonatal tetanus if they reside in districts with 
free delivery care. Further, neonates born to mothers in the treatment district are more likely to 
survive, which may have occurred due to increased prenatal care and tetanus vaccines. We provide 
new evidence that the program did prenatal care, which is contingent on wealth quintile, ethnicity 
and education.  
 In the second paper, we address the limited empirical evidence on the relationship between 
management and performance of private hospitals in Nepal, with emphasis on differences by 
performance indicator, patient type and analytical approach. We use de-identified inpatient data to 
assess the relationship between hospital management and performance. We estimate Pabon Lasso 
and regression models for native-born and foreign-born patients, and for the full sample of patients. 
Using a Pabon Lasso model, we assess relationship between hospital management and: bed 
occupancy rate; bed turnover rate; and average length of stay. To complement the Pabon Lasso 
model, we use a regression analysis to assess the relationship between hospital management and 
length of stay in a multivariate framework.  Our results indicate that separation between the Chief 
Executive Officer (CEO) and board may promote better performance (except the Pabon Lasso 
model favors CEO duality for average length of stay among native-born patients). However, results 
vary by performance indicator, patient type and analytical approach. We provide new evidence on 
the relationship between management and performance of private hospitals in a developing 
context. However, when it comes to evaluating management strategies, there are important 
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THE IMPACT OF THE SAFE DELIVERY INCENTIVE PROGRAM ON PRENATAL 
CARE AND NEONATAL MORTALITY IN NEPAL 
1.1 Introduction 
 In 2015, the maternal mortality ratio in developing countries was 239 per 100,000 live births, 
as opposed to 12 per 100,000 live births in developed countries (World Health Organization 
(WHO), 2018). Maternal mortality is attributed to complications that arise during pregnancy, 
childbirth and post pregnancy (WHO, 2018). Disparities also exist in child health; children in 
developing countries under the age of five were ten times more likely to die compared to children 
in developed countries (WHO, 2011). Moreover, an infant only has a 19 percent chance of 
surviving if the mother dies (United States Agency for International Development (USAID), 
2018). Correspondingly, four major causes of neonatal deaths are infections, prematurity, low-
birth weight and birth asphyxia (WHO, 2018). Thus, maternal and neonatal mortality is 
preventable through low-cost interventions, specifically immunization, prenatal care, skilled birth 
attendance and postnatal care.  
 The United Nations and WHO have been collaboratively working towards reducing maternal 
and child mortality rates to 70 per 100,000 live births and 12 per 1,000 live births, respectively, by 
the year 2030. Local governments are also working to reduce maternal and child mortality rates, 
which are predominantly South Asia. For example, in 2013, 24 percent of global maternal deaths 
occurred in South Asia, which consists of eight countries: Afghanistan; Bangladesh; Bhutan; India; 
Maldives; Nepal; Pakistan; and Sri Lanka (World Bank, 2015). These countries experienced a 65 
percent reduction in maternal mortality between 1990 and 2013 (World Bank, 2015), however 
challenges continue to exist. In 2016, approximately 1,010,274 newborns died in South Asia 
compared to 14,842 newborn deaths in North America (UNICEF, 2017). According to the United 
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Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), if this trends continues, South Asian countries will not 
achieve the goal of reducing neonatal mortality ratio to 12 per 1,000 live births by 2030 or 
UNICEF’s South Asian target of saving 500,000 newborns by 2021 (UNICEF, 2015). In 2012, 
government leaders from 80 countries and partners from various sectors (private, civil and faith-
based) convened in Washington D.C. as a ‘call to action’ to reduce maternal and child mortality 
worldwide (USAID, 2017). As a result of this meeting, 25 priority countries that account for two 
thirds of global maternal and newborn deaths were identified. Nepal is one of these priority 
countries.  
 Nepal is a landlocked, low-income country in South Asia.  Disparities in education, wealth 
and health exist between 126 ethnic castes, socio-economic classes and residential areas (rural 
versus urban). Also, with three distinct ecological zones – mountain, hill and terai (lowland region) 
– some Nepali mothers and children face geographical challenges especially in accessing health 
care. The Government of Nepal estimated that 23 newborns per 1000 live births died in 2015. 
(Ministry of Health, 2016). The main cause of death for Nepali mothers and neonates mirrors that 
experience in other developing countries: lack of access to health care during pregnancy, childbirth 
and after pregnancy (Ministry of Health, 2016). Relatedly, inequality, poor quality of healthcare 
facilities, undernutrition of mothers and lack of health care providers in remote areas are 
detrimental to the health of mothers and children in Nepal (El-Saharty, 2015). Furthermore, 
inequality is exacerbated by the existing caste system because economic and social well-being is 
directly correlated with ethnicity (DHS, 2008). Therefore, Janjati, Dalits, Terai/Madhesi and 
Muslim mothers have limited access to maternal and infant healthcare (DHS, 2008). Despite the 
challenges there has been a noteworthy reduction in maternal mortality in recent years due to 
interventions related to family planning, community-based approaches, subsidized or free care and 
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female community health volunteers (USAID, 2017). However, neonatal mortality remains 
stagnant and a serious concern. According to the Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) 
Program, between 2006 and 2010, 26 percent of Nepali mothers between the age of 15 and 49 did 
not receive prenatal care (DHS, 2011). Moreover, the use of such care increases with education, 
income and wealth, and is positively associated with living in an urban area. As an important part 
of prenatal care, mothers typically receive tetanus toxoid vaccinations to prevent neonatal tetanus, 
which is a major cause of death. Neonatal tetanus is the result of unhygienic birth practices, such 
as using rusted equipment to cut the umbilical cord after home delivery. This infection affects a 
newborn between the 3rd and 28th day after birth, and eventually results in arching of the body and 
painful convulsions (UNICEF, 2000). Described as an ‘invisible killer’, neonatal tetanus, has a 
fatality rate of 70 percent, largely infants delivered at home, and deaths often go unreported. 
However, immunization of mothers protects both mother and child since tetanus antibodies 
transfer to the fetus (WHO, 2012). Although preventable, worldwide neonatal tetanus was 
responsible for 14 percent of all neonatal deaths in 1998 (UNICEF, 2000). Despite achieving 
Maternal and Neonatal Tetanus Elimination in 2005 (less than 50 cases), neonatal tetanus cases in 
Nepal have sharply increased to over 250 in 2015 (WHO, 2016). To exacerbate this situation, there 
is a lack of insurance and social security in the country. Therefore, most healthcare costs, are paid 
out-of-pocket. 
  Following a series of seven consultation exercises, by the Ministry of Health and Population, 
called the Nepal Safer Motherhood Project (1998-2004) the Safe Delivery Incentive Program 
(SDIP) was introduced in July 2005 ((Sharma et al., 2007 and T. Ensor et al., 2009). This policy 
provided financial incentives to increase the use of maternity care services with the goal of 
reducing maternal and neonatal mortality (DHS, 2011). The program included a conditional cash 
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transfer to help with transportation costs, free delivery for mothers in the poorest 25 districts and 
a financial incentive for healthcare providers to participate in delivery. The cash transfer was 
specific to the geographical regions. Mothers residing in mountain, hill and terai regions received 
Nepali rupees in quantities of 1,500, 1,000 and 500 respectively (Pradhan et al., 2017). Due to 
differences in terrain and higher costs of transportation, mothers in the mountain region the largest 
transfer, and mothers in the hill received more than those in the terai region. Moreover, free 
delivery for mothers in poorest districts was allocated based on the Human Development Index 
(HDI). The HDI is the geometric mean of normalized indices for three dimensions: health; 
education; and standard of living. Therefore, based on the HDI report published in 2004, mothers 
in the 25 districts with the lowest HDI in 2001 were provided free delivery (Tropp et al., 2004). 
Thus, mothers in districts with the lowest HDI received free delivery care and a cash transfer for 
transportation expenses, mothers in the remaining 50 districts only received a cash transfer for 
transportation expenses. Regardless of geography, skilled birth providers were given a financial 
incentive (300 rupees) for each delivery they attended.  
 Due to the changing nature of the program (Table 1.1), this paper focuses on the policy 
period between 2005 and 2008, during which only women in the lowest HDI districts received free 
delivery. During this period, eligibility criteria and incentives remained quite stationary. Between 
2005 and 2007, women in lowest HDI districts were eligible to receive free delivery care if they 
resided in an eligible district, delivered in a public facility, had no more than two living children 
and were not diagnosed with obstetric complications (Pradhan et al., 2017). In 2007, the eligibility 
criteria were modified to include women with obstetric complications and those with two or more 
living children (Pradhan et al., 2017). This change has been accounted for during our analysis.  
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 Despite the fact that we focus on the policy period between 2005 and 2008, it is important 
to be aware of subsequent changes to the SDIP (Table 1.1). In 2009, the program was expanded 
and renamed the ‘Aama Program’ (Mother Program) (Aryal, n.d.). This program continues to focus 
on the removal of financial barriers for women seeking institutional deliveries. Unlike previous 
iterations of the policy, the ‘Aama Program’ removed user fees for all types of deliveries. 
Furthermore in 2012, women were given cash incentives for completing four antenatal care visits 
and, in 2016, the program was expanded to include free new born care. Other than these additions, 
the program continues to provide a cash transfer for transportation costs and a financial incentive 
for skilled birth providers. A considerable amount of resources – 4.33 billion rupees – has been 
allocated to this program overall (Aryal, n.d.). Therefore, it is important to understand the impact 
of this allocation on maternal and child health given the scarcity of resources in a country like 
Nepal, where purchasing power parity in 2005 was $1,499 (World Bank, 2017).  
 In this paper we examine the relationship between SDIP on prenatal care (including relevant 
vaccinations) and neonatal mortality. We do so using a difference-in-differences model, focusing 
on the free delivery component of the policy, which was implemented for mothers in 25 Nepali 
districts with the HDI. 
  
Table 1.1 Summary of Changes to the SDIP 
Year Change 
2005 Implementation of the SDIP 
2007 Removal of parity and obstetric complication restriction  
2009 Universal implementation of SDIP 
2012 Addition of a cash incentive for four prenatal care visits within first four, six, eight 
and nine months, and institutional delivery 






1.2 Literature Review 
1.2.1 Existing Literature on Safe Delivery Incentive Program 
 The financial burden of child birth can be immense, particularly in countries like Nepal, 
where an insurance system is absent, and families are obliged to prepare for a considerable amount 
of out of pocket expenditures. In Makwanpur district in Nepal, the mean cost of a normal delivery 
is NPR 4,042 ($ 63.2)1 and the cost of a caesarean is NPR 22,780 ($356.2) (Powell-Jackson et al., 
2009).  This is a substantial amount, given that the gross national income per capita in Nepal was 
$540 in 2010. Limited financial resources and immense costs result in difficult choices for mothers 
and families. They create barriers for access to care prior to birth, during and after-birth which 
contributes to high MMR and NMR (DHS, 2016).  Several studies indicate that, in Nepal, the 
decision to seek care is delayed due to costs associated with seeking care (Manandhar, 2000; 
Borghi et al., 2004; Pradhan et al., 2010). To address such financial barriers and promote healthy 
behavior, a substantial number of South Asian countries – Nepal, India, Bangladesh and Pakistan 
– have adopted cash transfers and voucher programs (Jehan et al., 2012). Nonetheless, 
implementation of these demand-side financial incentives is constrained by lack of awareness and 
weak governance. The success of similar financial incentive programs in Latin America has 
influenced countries from other parts of the world to follow suit (Powell-Jackson et al., 2012). The 
inclusion of various forms of financial incentives such as cash transfer is a key feature of programs 
trying to address maternal and child health outcomes in South Asia. Particularly, programs in 
Nepal, India, Bangladesh and Pakistan are based on the idea that financial incentives promote 
change in health behavior. These programs have been widely attributed to the success in utilization 
of maternal care (Jehan et al., 2012).  
                                                 
1 Conversion rate based on Powell-Jackson et al., paper. Current rate is 110 NPR per USD (July 11, 2018) 
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 Prior to discussing existing research, it is essential to distinguish between the two 
components of SDIP: free delivery care and cash transfer. Both components attempt to address 
financial barriers related to child-birth. Specifically, cash transfer provides a cash incentive to 
mothers to remove the financial barrier associated with the costs of transportation related to 
delivery in a health facility. Free delivery care (only provided to 25 districts), removes the financial 
burden incurred by families at the time of delivery, which allows women to have extra income that 
would have otherwise been spent on delivery care. 
 Researchers argue that there is limited evidence on the effectiveness of financial incentives, 
particularly in countries where government financial systems are weak, and programs are 
implemented at a large scale (Powell-Jackson et al., 2012). After collecting their own set of data, 
Powell-Jackson et al., explore the variation in cash transfer between regions and awareness of the 
program using a propensity score matching methods to conclude that Nepali women who were 
aware of the program were 4.2 percentage points more likely to deliver with a skilled birth 
attendant (Powell-Jackson et al., 2012). The treatment effect, however, is positively associated 
with the amount of cash transfer and quality of care. They also find that slow implementation of 
the program and lack of awareness has limited SDIP’s success. Similarly, in another qualitative 
study, after a set of interviews in ten districts and researchers find that the implementation of SDIP 
was challenging for district level authorities (Powell-Jackson et al., 2009). The complexity of the 
program did not enable smooth transition and the difficulties accessing funds made it challenging. 
They restate that compared to Latin America, health facilities in South Asian countries like Nepal 
are inadequate and weak. Apart from Powell-Jackson’s study on cash transfer, several researchers 
have explored the impact of free delivery care on institutional delivery and skilled birth attendance. 
Ensor et al., use a multilevel logit and the DHS dataset to conclude that the SDIP led to an increase 
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in institutional delivery in the terai and hill regions (Ensor et al., 2017). Likewise, both Pradhan et 
al., and Lamichhane et al., use DHS and difference-in-differences analysis to provide empirical 
evidence that the SDIP leads to increased skilled birth attendance (Pradhan et al., 2017 and 
Lamichhane at al., 2017). Lamichhane et al., also studied the impact of the SDIP on neonatal 
mortality and found that the policy lead to a decline in neonatal deaths. They attribute this success 
to increased institutional delivery. Both components of the SDIP has been attributed to the desired 
outcome of the policy: an increase in the use of maternity services such as skilled birth attendance 
and institution delivery (Ensor et al., 2017; Lamichhane at al., 2017; Powell-Jackson et al., 2012 
and Pradhan et al., 2017;). 
 A recurring theme in all the studies is the existence of inequality and disparities amongst 
those who live in rural areas and are in marginalized population. For example, Bhatt et al, (2018) 
find that wealth had a significant effect in determining antenatal care visits and Pradhan et al., 
(2017) find that the household’s wealth index determined access to delivery care (Bhatt et al., 2018 
and Pradhan et al., 2017). Likewise, Deo et al., (2015) identified that ethnic background, limited 
knowledge and information, women’s autonomy and strong beliefs on traditional healers affected 
the choice to utilize antenatal care. Despite increased enthusiasm for health services, use of the 
financial incentive provided by the SDIP is limited due to inadequate and inappropriate health 
infrastructure.  In addition, knowledge of the SDIP was limited and especially limited if the women 
were poorer and from disadvantaged or marginalized populations (Powell-Jackson et al., 2012) 
 Although several studies have examined the impact of the SDIP on maternal and child health, 
none have studied the impact of the SDIP on prenatal care. Since the goal of the SDIP is to improve 
maternal and child health through increased institutional delivery and skilled birth attendance, 
naturally, the majority of researchers have focused on the direct outcome. We are not aware of any 
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empirical analysis that has assessed the impact of this policy on prenatal care prior to the 
introduction of cash incentives to promote four antenatal care visits in 2012. Due to the impact of 
income on maternal and child use, we hypothesize that the SDIP increased the use of prenatal care 
services. 
1.2.2 Literature on Prenatal Care 
 Finlayson et al., conducted a metanalysis on what affects the use of prenatal services in 
middle and low-income countries (Finlayson et al., 2013). Among others, the costs associated with 
utilizing health care services related to maternal care served as a barrier. In the context of Nepal, 
multiple studies have demonstrated that cost is one of the major drivers in delaying the decision to 
seek maternal care (Manandhar et al., 2000 and Borghi et al., 2004).  
 Grossman’s theory on the demand for healthcare provides theory and empirical evidence on 
how people demand medical input to produce health (a capital good) to maximize their utility 
(Wahyuni, 2015). Age, education, health status and income influence the production of health 
capital. As such, wage rate and income influence the optimal stock of health capital. This 
framework has been applied, empirically, towards the production of infant health. One of the goods 
that enters the family utility function is infant health (Rosenzweig et al., 1983). Thus, an infant’s 
health capital is influenced by several factors such as the mother’s age, wage/income, education 
and knowledge. In congruence with Grossman’s theory, higher wages lead to an increased 
investment in health for both mothers and infants. An increase in income will enable a mother to 
afford better quality and quantity of health production inputs, such as medical care. Evidence 
suggests that household wealth does in fact affect prenatal care use from a trained provider (Celik, 
2000).  Specifically, in Nepal, “the poorest people are twice as likely as those who are least poor 
to reduce use of child health services in response to an increase in price” (Borghi et al., 2006). 
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Thus, we hypothesis that the provision of free delivery allows households to invest in other health 
services, such as prenatal care, due to a relaxed budget constraint and savings that would have 
otherwise been invested for delivery care. Since households in the 25 districts do not have to spend 
their limited budget on “deliveries – the single most costly event during pregnancy”, they can 
allocate their resources on the production of health for their mother and infant, i.e. prenatal care 
(Borghi et al., 2006). Empirical evidence demonstrates that prenatal care has a significant and 
positive effect on infant health. Thus, we hypothesize that if there is a reduction in neonatal 
mortality, this may have occurred due to increased prenatal care because of SDIP. Measuring the 
impact on neonatal mortality has two distinct purposes: first is to measure the intended impact of 
this policy and second is to use this measurement as a proxy for the quality of care these women 
receive (Powell-Jackson et al., 2009). If the services are underutilized and if they are inadequate 
we should expect to see no effect on neonatal health or, worse, an increase in neonatal mortality. 
Research on the impact of SDIP on one district, Makwanpur, found that SDIP did not have any 
impact on neonatal mortality (Powell-Jackson et al., 2009). A recent study by Pradhan et al., 
examined the impact of SDIP on increased skilled birth attendance (Pradhan et al., 2017). 
However, they mention that their dataset is not adequately powered to detect effects on health 
outcomes. Another study measures the impact of SDIP on outcomes related to delivery and 
neonatal death (Lamichhane et al., 2017). They do so by studying two different phases of the 
policy, where the first phase is the earlier period with parity restriction and the longer phase is 
without the restriction (Table 1.1). Researchers find a negative and statistically significant effect 
of SDIP on the probability of neonatal deaths.  
 Generally, it is difficult to isolate the causal effect on income on the dependent variable due 
to confounding issues and selectivity issues (Wahyuni, 2015). However, the nature of 
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implementation of SDIP allows us to create a natural experiment where the women in 25 districts, 
despite their income, can engage in the policy. Due to the universal implementation of the free 
delivery policy, we do not face a selectivity issue when we conduct this analysis since mothers are 
not selecting into the treatment group. To my knowledge, there is no empirical evidence in the 
context of SDIP’s impact on prenatal care. Furthermore, due to the maternal and neonatal tetanus 
elimination status, researchers have not examined the impact of this policy on tetanus toxoid 
vaccination which is administered during prenatal care. This vaccination is known to be a cost-
effective and less expensive prevention for both maternal and neonatal mortality. Additionally, if 
we study the impact of the SDIP on tetanus vaccination it can serve as a proxy for quality of care. 
Since this vaccination is required to be administered during the prenatal care period, if mothers are 
not receiving this service despite increases in prenatal care, we can infer that care for mothers in 
that area is inadequate.  
1.3 Data & Methods 
 We use cross-sectional microdata from the DHS, which has administered surveys in more 
than 90 developing countries since 1984. Primarily funded by the USAID, these surveys are 
dispensed in collaboration with a local government organization and have been acclaimed for 
collecting nationally representative data related to health and population. The objective of the DHS 
program is to provide data that is comparable across countries and usually across time (DHS, 
2011).  
 DHS surveys are conducted every five years. Using four types of questionnaires – household, 
women, men and biomarker – the survey collects data using a stratified two-stage cluster design. 
The first stage includes enumeration areas drawn from the census files and the second stage 
includes a sample of households based on an updated list in the enumeration area. To allow for 
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population-level inference, the DHS program uses a probability sampling methodology. Units such 
as eligible mothers and households are selected randomly, and the goal is to cover the full target 
population in the country. The questionnaire includes detailed information about socio-economic, 
demographic characteristics, fertility, family planning, mortality, marriage, reproductive health, 
child health and nutrition. The data are publicly available, and users must request data with a short 
description of their intended use.  
 For this analysis, we use microdata for Nepal from the 2006 and 20112 DHS dataset. We 
focus on 2001 to 2008, which includes the period before and after implementation of the SDIP. 
Specifically, pre-policy period is 2001 to 2004 and post-policy period is 2005-2008. Our sample 
includes Nepali mothers between the age of 15 and 49.  We focus on married mothers, to whom 
98.9 percent of children are born, since the majority of mothers in Nepal are married. We do not 
include mothers who had more than one live birth during the study period. The unit of analysis is 
children of eligible women born in the last five years. Our estimating sample includes 5,317 live 
births (to 5,317 separate women). 
 We estimate the effect of the SDIP on prenatal care by considering its impact on: 
immunization against neonatal tetanus; receipt of prenatal care in general; receipt of prenatal care 
by a doctor; receipt of prenatal care by a nurse or midwife. We also focus on neonatal mortality to 
determine the overall impact on child health. Our outcome variables are dichotomous, thus we use 
probit regressions with marginal effects. Immunization against neonatal tetanus is measured as the 
“number of tetanus toxoid injections given during the pregnancy to avoid convulsions after birth” 
(DHS, 2016, page 55).  There is evidence that pregnant mothers with at least two injections 
experienced a large reduction in neonatal tetanus (DHS, 2016). Consequently, women who 
                                                 




received two or more injections are given a value of 1 and 0 otherwise.  
 We include a number of controls for household and individual characteristics in our models. 
Since the use of prenatal care was directly correlated with economic power, in this study we control 
for household characteristics such as wealth index and region of residence (Sepehri et al., 2008). 
The DHS generates a wealth index based on a statistical procedure known as principal components 
analysis. The wealth index is based on a household’s ownership of specific assets such as a 
television, bicycle, house construction materials, types of water access and sanitation.  Gabrysch 
et al., (2009) perform a meta-analysis of over 80 studies on characteristic affecting use of delivery 
services and determined that among other factors, it is important to control for mother’s age, 
education, ethnicity, religion, occupation and birth order of the child. Appendix A contains a list 
of my variables, the corresponding DHS variables and how they were coded. 
1.3.1 Difference in Differences 
 Exposure to the SDIP was determined by district of resident and was independent of 
individual characteristics of mothers therein (i.e. all mothers in selected districts were affected by 
the policy). The selected districts were determined based on low HDI. Figure 1.1 below illustrates 





 We exploit the exogenous variations across groups and time to estimate the impact of the 
SDIP on prenatal care and neonatal mortality. The following equation summarizes our difference-
in-differences model.  
𝑌𝑖 = 𝛽1𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖 + 𝛽3(𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑖  × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖) + 𝜶𝑿 + 𝜀𝑖               [1] 
i indexes individuals. Y denotes the respective outcome variable. Districti is a dummy variable to 
indicate whether a woman resides in the treatment district. Posti is a dummy variable to indicate 
whether a woman is observed in the post-policy period. The coefficient on the interaction (i.e. β3) 
indicates the impact of the SDIP on the outcome variable in question. β1, β2 and α, are parameters 
to be estimated and X is a vector of covariates described above. εi is the error term.   We estimate 
Equation 1 using probit regressions, with normalized sampling weights and standard errors 
clustered by district.  
  
Figure 1.1 Map of Nepal with treatment (grey) and control (white) districts  
 




1.4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 Prior to discussing the probit estimates, we describe changes in the outcome variable before 
and after the SDIP separately for treatment and control groups. Figures 1.3-1.7 illustrate changes 
in neonatal mortality, prenatal care, prenatal care from a doctor, prenatal care from a nurse/midwife 
and tetanus vaccination, respectively. The test of whether the percentage change was significant 
or not between each group is presented in Appendix B. Neonatal mortality (Figure 1.3) declined 
for the treatment group after implementation of SDIP, as opposed to the control group where 
neonatal mortality slightly increased. After the SDIP, prenatal care (Figure 1.4), prenatal care from 
a doctor (Figure 1.5), prenatal care from a nurse/midwife (Figure 1.6) and tetanus vaccination 
(Figure 1.7) increased in the treatment and control districts. Increases were much larger for the 
treatment group. As previously states, our goal is to determine whether these changes were 
plausibly caused by the SDIP, controlling for related factors.  
 
































Figure 1.4 Percent of Mothers that Received Prenatal Care in Control and Treatment Districts, 
Before and After SDIP 
 
 
Figure 1.5 Percent of Mothers that Received Prenatal Care from a Doctor in Control and 


































































Figure 1.6 Percent of Mothers that Received Prenatal Care from a Nurse/Midwife in Control and 
Treatment Districts, Before and After SDIP 
 
Figure 1.7 Percent of Mothers that Received Tetanus Vaccinations during Prenatal Care in 
Control and Treatment Districts, Before and After SDIP 
 
 Covariates listed in table 1.2 pertain to the mother’s socio-demographic characteristics. The 
table contains means of covariates before and after SDIP in treatment and control groups. In the 
control group approximately, 75 percent of mothers are from a rural area versus 89 percent of 
















































































are from the terai region, 40 percent from the hills and 15 percent from the mountains. Between 
treatment and control group, pre and post SDIP, there seems to be no or very low statistically 
significant difference in terms of mothers’ ecological region. Average age varies from 23 is 28 
years between the subgroups. While a higher percentage of mothers are non-Hindu (Buddhist, 
Christian, Kirati and Muslim) in the treatment group (13 percent), post SDIP, less mothers in 
treatment groups were non-Hindu (5 percent). Percentage of mothers with no education remains 
consistent in treatment group before and after the policy, however, in the control group less 
mothers have no education after the SDIP.  Approximately, 13 percent of mothers in all sub groups 
have some primary education. There is a big jump in percentage of mothers with complete primary 
education in the control group between the policy period. However, there is no statistically 
significant difference in the treatment group for mothers with complete primary education in the 
treatment group. In terms of secondary education, higher percentage of mothers were getting 
secondary education in both treatment and control group, pre and post SDIP.  Also related to socio-
economic status, less mothers in the control district were employed in a non-agriculture occupation 
post policy. However, in the treatment group more mothers were employed in a non-agriculture 
occupation post-policy. Non-agricultural occupation is an aggregation of professional, clerical, 
sales, services and manual labor (Appendix B). Higher percentages of mothers in the control group 
post-policy were unemployed compared to the treatment group where less mothers in the treatment 
group were unemployed. Given that lower percentages of mothers in the control group are from 
rural areas compared to mothers in the treatment group, percentage of mothers in the agriculture 
occupation did not change post-policy in the treatment group.  Finally, in terms of ethnicity there 




 Table 1.2 Means of covariates in treatment and control group, pre and post SDIP 
 Control Group Treatment Group 
 Pre Post Difference Pre Post Difference 
Mountain 0.1426 0.1249 0.0177* 0.2500 0.2941 -0.0441 
 (0.0068) (0.0075) (0.0102) (0.0280) (0.0213) (0.0357) 
Hill 0.3903 0.3967 -0.0064 0.4542 0.4619 -0.0077 
 (0.0094) (0.0111) (0.0146) (0.0322) (0.0233) (0.0398) 
Terai 0.4671 0.4784 -0.0114 0.2958 0.2440 0.0518 
 (0.0097) (0.0113) (0.0149) (0.0295) (0.0201) (0.0350) 
Mother's age 28.2380 27.4466 0.7915*** 23.5167 27.7386 -4.2219*** 
 (0.1254) (0.1397) (0.1892) (0.2544) (0.2938) (0.4461) 
Poor 0.4517 0.4440 0.0077 0.7083 0.7102 -0.0019 
 (0.0096) (0.0113) (0.0148) (0.0294) (0.0212) (0.0362) 
Middle 0.1770 0.1840 -0.0069 0.1792 0.1765 0.0027 
 (0.0074) (0.0088) (0.0115) (0.0248) (0.0178) (0.0305) 
Rich 0.3713 0.3720 -0.0008 0.1125 0.1133 -0.0008 
 (0.0093) (0.0110) (0.0144) (0.0204) (0.0148) (0.0253) 
Unemployed 0.1632 0.2055 -0.0424*** 0.1792 0.1089 0.0702*** 
 (0.0071) (0.0092) (0.0115) (0.0248) (0.0146) (0.0270) 
Ag Work 0.6557 0.6202 0.0354** 0.7625 0.7691 -0.0066 
 (0.0092) (0.0110) (0.0143) (0.0275) (0.0197) (0.0337) 
Non-Ag Work 0.1811 0.1742 0.0069 0.0583 0.1220 -0.0637*** 
 (0.0075) (0.0086) (0.0114) (0.0152) (0.0153) (0.0238) 
No education 0.5883 0.4584 0.1299*** 0.6875 0.6972 -0.0097 
 (0.0095) (0.0113) (0.0147) (0.0300) (0.0215) (0.0368) 
Some Primary 0.1287 0.1387 -0.0100 0.1375 0.1002 0.0373 
 (0.0065) (0.0078) (0.0101) (0.0223) (0.0140) (0.0252) 
Complete Primary 0.2081 0.2785 -0.0704*** 0.1542 0.1438 0.0104 
 (0.0079) (0.0102) (0.0126) (0.0234) (0.0164) (0.0283) 
Secondary 0.0749 0.1244 -0.0495*** 0.0208 0.0588 -0.0380** 
 (0.0051) (0.0075) (0.0087) (0.0092) (0.0110) (0.0166) 
Rural 0.7433 0.7508 -0.0075 0.8875 0.8911 -0.0036 
 (0.0085) (0.0098) (0.0130) (0.0204) (0.0146) (0.0250) 
Brahmin 0.1246 0.1249 -0.0002 0.0875 0.0784 0.0091 
 (0.0064) (0.0075) (0.0098) (0.0183) (0.0126) (0.0218) 
Chhetri 0.0329 0.1552 -0.1223*** 0.0375 0.3660 -0.3285*** 
 (0.0035) (0.0082) (0.0081) (0.0123) (0.0225) (0.0324) 
Dalit 0.1471 0.0668 0.0803*** 0.1958 0.0458 0.1501*** 
 (0.0069) (0.0057) (0.0094) (0.0257) (0.0098) (0.0229) 
Newar 0.0404 0.1310 -0.0906*** 0.0208 0.2113 -0.1905*** 
 (0.0038) (0.0077) (0.0079) (0.0092) (0.0191) (0.0272) 
Janjati 0.5269 0.2158 0.3111*** 0.4875 0.1046 0.3829*** 
 (0.0097) (0.0093) (0.0138) (0.0323) (0.0143) (0.0306) 
Muslim 0.0371 0.2523 -0.2153*** 0.0625 0.1852 -0.1227*** 




Table 1.2 Continued 
 
Terai-Madhesi 0.0909 0.0540 0.0370*** 0.1083 0.0087 0.0996*** 
 (0.0056) (0.0051) (0.0078) (0.0201) (0.0043) (0.0157) 
Non-Hindu 0.1317 0.1377 -0.0060 0.1000 0.0523 0.0477** 
 (0.0065) (0.0078) (0.0102) (0.0194) (0.0104) (0.0201) 
Birth order  3.1995 2.7996 0.3999*** 1.7042 3.0153 -1.3111*** 
 (0.0402) (0.0419) (0.0591) (0.0518) (0.0908) (0.1311) 
N 2672 1946 4618 240 459 699 
 
1.5 Probit Results 
 Table 1.3 contains baseline probabilities marginal effects from the probit models assessed at 
sample means with dichotomous variables set to zero.  Again, the difference-in-differences 
(Districti × Posti) estimator here represents the average causal treatment effect of SDIP on: neonatal 
mortality; prenatal care in general; prenatal care from a doctor; prenatal care by a nurse or a 
midwife; and tetanus vaccination. Note that causal inference relies on a number of assumptions, 
which are assessed in a later section.   
Table 1.3 Probit marginal effect estimates for equation 1  
 Neonatal 
Mortality 




Baseline 0.0104 0.8528 0.1655 0.3666 0.6850 
Districti 0.0193* -0.2329*** -0.1291*** -0.2232*** -0.1601** 
 (0.0111) (0.0572) (0.0249) (0.0419) (0.0628) 
Posti 0.0081*** 0.0543*** 0.0083 0.0497** -0.0150 
 (0.0030) (0.0184) (0.0207) (0.0251) (0.0224) 
Districti × Posti -0.0098*** 0.0792** 0.1158* 0.2322** 0.1453*** 
 (0.0034) (0.0308) (0.0700) (0.0907) (0.0387) 
Mountain -0.0013 0.0127 0.0006 0.0755 -0.0390 
 (0.0035) (0.0256) (0.0309) (0.0565) (0.0400) 
Terai  -0.0072** 0.1025*** -0.0280 -0.0313 0.1793*** 
 (0.0031) (0.0271) (0.0279) (0.0328) (0.0403) 
Age -0.0018 0.0114** 0.0132* 0.0051 0.0213** 
 (0.0016) (0.0055) (0.0077) (0.0106) (0.0105) 
Age2 0.0000 -0.0002* -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0003* 
 (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Poor -0.0029 -0.0764*** -0.0582*** -0.1014*** -0.1139*** 
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Rich 0.0033 0.0324 0.1250*** 0.1299*** -0.0107 
 (0.0047) (0.0218) (0.0290) (0.0304) (0.0309) 
Unemployed 0.0040 -0.0083 0.1210*** 0.0059 -0.0151 
 (0.0051) (0.0288) (0.0306) (0.0307) (0.0276) 
Non-Ag Work 0.0148** 0.0056 0.0655** 0.0180 -0.0368 
 (0.0068) (0.0194) (0.0270) (0.0315) (0.0274) 
No Education 0.0075 -0.1008*** -0.0907*** -0.0634* -0.1090*** 
 (0.0051) (0.0197) (0.0212) (0.0330) (0.0271) 
Some Primary 0.0051 -0.0335 -0.0439** 0.0247 -0.0515* 
 (0.0076) (0.0276) (0.0213) (0.0281) (0.0299) 
Secondary -0.0118*** 0.1559*** 0.0889** -0.0408 0.0943*** 
 (0.0020) (0.0163) (0.0424) (0.0401) (0.0309) 
Rural 0.0052 0.0028 -0.1251*** -0.1001** 0.0105 
 (0.0036) (0.0182) (0.0278) (0.0497) (0.0252) 
Chhetri -0.0017 -0.0126 -0.0443** -0.0096 -0.0131 
 (0.0062) (0.0439) (0.0225) (0.0397) (0.0514) 
Dalit 0.0139 -0.0958** -0.0309 -0.0758* -0.1639*** 
 (0.0139) (0.0447) (0.0305) (0.0447) (0.0518) 
Newar  -0.0026 -0.0615 -0.0198 -0.1081*** -0.0779* 
 (0.0071) (0.0425) (0.0292) (0.0418) (0.0462) 
Janjati 0.0040 -0.1316*** -0.0344 -0.1569*** -0.1800*** 
 (0.0065) (0.0422) (0.0222) (0.0377) (0.0443) 
Muslim 0.0025 -0.1131** -0.0395 -0.1546*** -0.1472*** 
 (0.0072) (0.0521) (0.0272) (0.0422) (0.0517) 
Teraimadh 0.0047 -0.1272* -0.0196 -0.1351*** 0.0010 
 (0.0096) (0.0737) (0.0376) (0.0522) (0.0441) 
Non-Hindu -0.0029 -0.0352 -0.0239 -0.0320 0.0165 
 (0.0035) (0.0289) (0.0188) (0.0337) (0.0353) 
Birth order -0.0011 -0.0372*** -0.0526*** -0.0286*** -0.0412*** 
 (0.0012) (0.0048) (0.0096) (0.0087) (0.0075) 
N 5,317 5,317 5,317 5,317 5,317 
Robust standard errors clustered by district are reported in parentheses unless otherwise 
indicated. Statistical significance is given by: * ten percent; ** five percent; and *** one percent.  
 
1.5.1 Neonatal Mortality 
 First, we examine the relationship between SDIP and neonatal mortality. We find that, after 
the SDIP was implemented in the treatment districts, there was a lower probability of neonatal 
mortality by about 94 percent (i.e. 0.0098 on the baseline probability of 0.0104).  
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 In terms of the covariates, neonates born to mothers in the terai region were less likely to die 
compared to those born to mothers in the hill region. Neonatal mortality in the mountain versus 
hill region, however had no statistically significant difference. Next, we examine the relationship 
between socio-economic characteristics of mothers and neonatal mortality. Neonates born to 
mothers with higher levels of education were less likely to die by one percent compared to neonates 
born to mothers who completed primary education. However, neonates born to mothers employed 
in non-agricultural sectors were more likely to die by one percent relative to mothers employed in 
the agricultural sector. The difference between neonates born to unemployed mothers versus those 
employed in the agriculture sector is not statistically significant. The relationship between neonatal 
mortality and the remaining covariates – age, wealth quintile, ethnicity, religion and birth order – 
is not statistically significant.  
1.5.2 Prenatal Care 
 Our results indicate that the SDIP increased the likelihood of getting prenatal care – overall, 
as well as from a doctor, nurse/midwife and tetanus vaccination respectively – for mothers in the 
treatment districts in the post-policy period. Precisely, the policy increased the probability of 
getting prenatal care by nine percent (i.e. 0.079 on the baseline probability of 0.852). Similarly, 
the SDIP improved the probability of receiving prenatal care from a doctor and a nurse/midwife 
by 70 and 63 percent respectively. Consistent with the increased utilization of prenatal care 
mothers’ vaccination against tetanus toxoid increased by 21 percent.  
 In terms of covariates, we find that mothers in the terai region are more likely to access 
prenatal care by 10 percent compared to mothers in the hill region. Furthermore, if mothers reside 
in a rural area, they are less likely to get prenatal care from a doctor or nurse/midwife by 13 and 
10 percent respectively. While mothers in the poorest wealth quintile were less likely to access 
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prenatal care – overall, as well as by a doctor, nurse/midwife and tetanus vaccination– mothers in 
richest wealth quintile were more likely to receive prenatal care from a doctor or a nurse/midwife, 
compared to those in the middle wealth quintile.  Similarly, mothers with higher levels of education 
were more likely to access prenatal care, prenatal care from a doctor and tetanus vaccination by 
16, eight and nine percent, respectively, compared to mothers with complete primary education. 
Conversely, mothers with lower levels of education (some primary) were less likely to get prenatal 
care from a doctor. Furthermore, mothers with no education were less likely to get any kind of 
prenatal care, from a nurse/midwife as well as tetanus vaccination by ten, six and 11 percent, 
respectively. Indigenous mothers (Janjati, Dalit, Muslim and Terai Madhesi) were less likely to 
get prenatal care overall, prenatal care from a nurse/midwife and immunization against tetanus, as 
opposed to Brahmin mothers. Finally, older mothers were more likely to get all components of 
prenatal care; however, higher birth orders were associated with lower levels of prenatal care 
(DHS, 2011). It is possible that higher birth orders are attributed with unwanted pregnancy, 
therefore mothers are less likely to seek prenatal care (DHS, 2011).  
1.6 Robustness 
 Table 1.4 reports difference-in-differences estimators for various robustness checks 
compared to that reported earlier. We control for time trends, access to radio, mother’s literacy, 




Table 1.4 Difference-in-differences Estimators for Robustness Checks 
 
1.6.1 Time Trends 
 First, we add time trends. The purpose of this robustness check is to ensure that our base 
model is not only reporting general improvements in health outcomes over time, but also the 
impact of the SDIP. When we include year controls, signs remain consistent for all five outcomes. 
Significance changes to ten percent for neonatal mortality and remains consistent for others. The 
size of the effect of SDIP increases for all outcomes. We conclude that SDIP did have an impact 
on prenatal care and neonatal mortality. 
1.6.2 Radio 
 Anecdotal evidence in Powell-Jackson et al (2012) suggests that radio was the primary 
means of disseminating information about the SDIP. Radio communication about SDIP leaves 












Baseline -0.0098*** 0.0792** 0.1158* 0.2322** 0.1453*** 5,317 
 (0.0034) (0.0308) (0.0700) (0.0907) (0.0387)  
Time Trends -0.6118* 0.3691** 0.4240* 0.5487** 0.4228*** 5,310 
 (0.3335) (0.1859) (0.2193) (0.2358) (0.1442)  
Radio -0.0097*** 0.0790** 0.1177* 0.2320** 0.1447*** 5,317 
 (0.0033) (0.0310) (0.0705) (0.0908) (0.0389)  
Literacy -0.0112*** 0.0837** 0.1054 0.2341*** 0.1421*** 5316 
 (0.0036) (0.0348) (0.0686) (0.0896) (0.0390)  
Parity -0.0100*** 0.0894*** 0.1015 0.2354** 0.1679*** 5,317 
 (0.0029) (0.0282) (0.0760) (0.0988) (0.0374)  
Exclude KTM -0.0105*** 0.0806** 0.0984 0.2249** 0.1395*** 5,187 
 (0.0036) (0.0329) (0.0644) (0.0922) (0.0394)  
Father’s Education -0.0098*** 0.0826*** 0.1174* 0.2324** 0.1420*** 5,302 
 (0.0032) (0.0285) (0.0674) (0.0911) (0.0384)  
Parallel Trends 0.0777 0.0343 -0.0674 0.0112 0.0496 2,536 
 (0.0603) (0.0413) (0.0421) (0.0890) (0.0486)  
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listened to radios compared to 67 percent mountain and hill mothers. Therefore, we hypothesize 
that mothers with a radio were more likely to hear about the policy, which could affect utilization 
of prenatal care and neonatal mortality. Compared to our base model, a control for radio has no 
impact on the size, sign and significance of the difference-in-differences estimator.   
1.6.3 Literacy 
 Evidence suggests that, in developing countries, it is challenging to compare educational 
attainment since there is considerable variation in quality and access across regions: ‘completion 
of primary education’ does not have consistent meaning (Smith-Greenaway, 2015). Several 
researchers have recommended that ‘literacy’ is a more effective control (Smith-Greenaway, 2015 
and Miller et al., 2017). Usually, information regarding policies are disseminated in pamphlets or 
posters, making the ability to read important. Thus, as a robustness, we replace educational 
attainment (main model) with literacy and we find that SDIP had no impact on prenatal care. We 
can infer that, as a result of unawareness, there were no significant effects of SDIP on prenatal 
care when we include literacy as a covariate. This result is particularly important in the context of 
mothers in marginalized group since they tend to have lower literacy rates (DHS, 2008). 
1.6.4 Parity and Birth Complication 
 Lamichhane et al., (2017) present anecdotal evidence that the parity and birth complication 
restrictions were lifted, “precisely to ensure women with high parity can also utilize health 
services” (S Aryal, personal communication). They hypothesize that mothers with obstetric 
complications are highly price elastic to maternal care services. In this section, we assess the 
impact of the SDIP on our outcomes prior to the implementation of the parity restriction. We find 
that results are consistent besides the impact of SDIP on prenatal care from a doctor. Weak results 
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in relation to a mother’s access to prenatal care from a doctor is not surprising. Recall that Powell 
et al., (2012) and Witter et al., (2011) address the issue of weak governance and inadequate 
resources. Although women are eligible to receive free institutional and skilled birth delivery, slow 
implementation and lack of doctors had no effect on prenatal care.  
1.6.5 Exclusion of Kathmandu 
 Given huge disparities in access to healthcare in Kathmandu versus the rest of the country, 
we exclude the capital as a robustness check (Lamichhane et al., 2017). This allows us to ensure 
that our control group is not conflated due to the inclusion of Kathmandu. While the impact of 
SDIP on neonatal mortality, prenatal care overall, from a nurse/midwife and tetanus vaccination 
remains consistent, the result is quite different for prenatal care from a doctor. There were no 
statistically significant differences between treatment and control groups post-policy in terms of 
prenatal care provided by a doctor. Also, other researchers find that SDIP had no impact on 
institution delivery when they performed a robustness check by excluding Kathmandu district 
(Lamichhane et al., 2017). Consequently, other researchers have found that access to roads had a 
significant effect in access to skilled birth attendance (Pradhan et al., 2017). This result validates 
our concern with SDIP regarding the persistent inequal provision of healthcare.   
1.6.6 Father’s Education 
 Finally, we control for the impact of father’s education. Researchers have indicated that it is 
important to account for mother’s autonomy since it affects her decision to seek medical care (Deo 
et al., 2015). Thus, we include father’s education as a covariate to control for his influence and 
social status. We find the effect of the SDIP on our outcomes is consistent with the base model.  
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1.6.7  Assumptions of the Difference-in-differences Model 
 A difference-in-differences model allows us to examine average treatment effect of the SDIP 
on the outcomes of interest. It requires that the following assumptions hold: policy should not be 
determined by the outcome; composition of treatment and control group is consistent pre-policy 
and post-policy intervention; and treatment and control groups exhibit parallel trends prior to the 
intervention. We test the parallel trends assumption (Table 1.4). To do so, the period prior to the 
SDIP (2001-2004) was tested using equation 1. We conclude that there were no statistically 
significant differences between the treatment and control group prior to the implementation of 
SDIP. 
1.7 Discussion 
 The SDIP program has been assessed by several researchers and there is empirical evidence 
on SDIP’s relationship with institutional delivery and skilled birth attendance. Yet, there is limited 
empirical evidence on SDIP’s relationship with prenatal care and neonatal mortality. Specifically, 
there is no evidence regarding the impact of SDIP on tetanus vaccination. This paper addresses the 
current gap in literature by providing empirical evidence on the effect of SDIP on prenatal care 
and neonatal mortality. Moreover, there have been expansions to the SDIP with limited empirical 
evidence therefore it is important to address the existing gaps (Aryal, n.d.).  
 We exploit the exogenous financial shock, the availability of free delivery to all mothers in 
the treatment district, to assess the impact on the use of prenatal care and on the impact on neonatal 
mortality. In this paper, we find that free delivery improved mothers’ chances of receiving prenatal 
care and decreased the likelihood of neonatal deaths. As such, this paper adds to prior evidence 
that SDIP not only increased skilled birth attendance and institutional deliveries but also improved 
average mothers’ likelihood of getting prenatal care (supported by this study). Perhaps mothers’ 
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first point of contact, prenatal care, further influences mothers to go back for an institutional 
delivery. Agglomeration of these choices by mothers influence the reduction of neonatal mortality.   
 Also, vaccinations against tetanus provided during prenatal care is instrumental for the 
survival of both mother and neonates. This paper provides evidence that SDIP increased the 
likelihood of a mother’s immunization against tetanus, thus decreasing the likelihood of neonatal 
mortality caused due to neonatal tetanus. Furthermore, we can speculate that those who get 
vaccinated during prenatal care are also motivated to come back for an institutional delivery. Thus, 
fewer mothers deliver at home, which is usually where they are exposed to rusted equipment and 
unsanitary delivery condition. 
 In congruence with existing literature, our model also demonstrates that mothers from poorer 
households were less likely to receive prenatal care as well as its components (Deo et al., 2015 and 
Finlayson et al., 2013). Therefore, free delivery care removed a substantial financial burden 
associated with institutional delivery costs.  Recall that poorer households are highly price elastic 
to child healthcare costs. As such, this ‘extra’ income relaxes the household’s budget constraint, 
which allows mothers to seek prenatal care to produce health for herself and for her infant. 
Therefore, SDIP has not only increases institution delivery (Pradhan et al., 2017 and Lamichhane 
at al., 2017) but also increases prenatal care (as per this study). However, there is a caveat to the 
success of SDIP.  
 Past studies have demonstrated that inequality continues to exist in Nepal (Borghi et al., 
2006; Powell-Jackson et al., 2012; Deo et al., 2015; Bhatt et al., 2018 and Pradhan et al., 2017). 
Marginalized and vulnerable populations face the highest mortality and healthcare access 
challenges. Furthermore, our model also demonstrates that neonatal deaths are higher among 
women who are less educated, employed in nonagricultural industries and among those that do not 
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live in the terai. Prenatal care is challenging for those who are less educated, are from the poorest 
wealth quintile, reside in a rural area, or belong to an Indigenous group. Policy makers should be 
aware of such inequalities especially at the prenatal care stage because as we progress through the 
maternal care process – prenatal care, delivery and postnatal care – we lose mothers’ participation 
and neonates born to mothers from marginalized populations along the process. If policy makers 
do not address issues of limited access to prenatal care, especially for those in marginalized ethnic 
groups, lower income families, mothers with lower levels of education and those that reside in 
regions with challenging terrain, inequality will continue to grow. A study reports that although 
SDIP addresses financial barrier as a major constraint for mothers, if implementation of the SDIP 
is not improved, women in excluded groups will continue to be left behind due to economic 
barriers. Further, the excluded groups face challenges such as illiteracy and lower social status 
besides just income barriers, which continues to create inequality (DHS, 2008). 
 As other researchers have mentioned in previous studies, our model is based on ‘intent to 
treat estimates’ (Lamichhane et al., 2017 and Pradhan et al., 2017). We do not capture whether a 
mother got free delivery care because of SDIP. However, researchers can use propensity score 
matching to generate the probability of being treated given the pre-treatment characteristics of 
mothers.  The slow nature of implementation of the SDIP with bureaucratic and practical difficulty 
is not reported in these estimates. Slow implementation also means mothers in treatment districts 
may not have accessed free delivery care immediately after the policy was implemented.  
 We are especially unaware about the quality of care received by those that are in 
disadvantaged populations. Although mothers receive prenatal care, we do not have adequate 
information to make conclusions about where she received the care. As such, we cannot provide 
recommendations on which districts require more quality care; for instance, some districts may 
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require more doctors or more hospitals. Further, in this study we do not estimate the direct impact 
of prenatal care on neonatal mortality. This could be addressed in future work.  
 Another limitation of this study is migration. Unfortunately, we do not observe the birthplace 
of the child. Thus, our estimates are based on mother’s residence district. Treatment districts have 
very low HDI; it would therefore be unconventional for mothers to migrate to difficult terrains 
with poorer living conditions for free delivery care. But we can expect outmigration from the 
treatment districts to urban areas. Therefore, our results may underestimate the effect of this policy 
since we do not observe if the mother received free delivery and if she migrated. Additionally, we 
are unable to measure the impact on this policy on maternal mortality due to the constraints of the 
dataset. Finally, if we test for statistically significant difference between our main estimates and 
robustness checks, it will allow us to make stronger conclusions about the effect of controlling for 
radio, literacy, parity, Kathmandu, father’s education. 
1.8 Conclusion 
 Despite several limitations, this study addresses an existing gap in literature: the impact of 
SDIP on prenatal care. While we have been attributing the success of decline in neonatal mortality 
to institutional delivery and skilled birth attendance, it is critical to pay attention to the potential 
impact of prenatal care on neonatal mortality, especially because majority of neonate deaths are 
attributed to infections such as neonatal tetanus. Although Nepal reached neonatal tetanus 
elimination status, a recent study demonstrated that in recent years deaths due to neonatal tetanus 
has indeed increased. Therefore, immunization against tetanus, which is provided to mothers 
during prenatal care, is equally important. In this study we provide evidence that SDIP led to an 
increase in prenatal care utilization and decrease in neonatal mortality. We infer that decreased 
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neonatal mortality is a product of increase in institutional delivery as well as increased prenatal 
care.  
 There are several implications to this result. First, we find that after certain financial barriers 
are removed, Nepali mothers opted to consume maternal care (prenatal care) to produce health for 
both mother and infant. This result leads us to our second conclusion: given multiple South Asian 
countries are attempting to change mothers’ behavior through various cash incentives, the removal 
of financial barriers seems to be effective. However, a blanket policy will not help address global 
and national issues of maternal and neonatal mortality. If global actors and nations hope to see a 
sustainable change in neonatal and maternal mortality, policy makers must not only address 
existing financial barriers but must also pay special attention to barriers that affect marginalized 
populations.  Therefore, policy-makers ought to address other barriers and incorporate policies that 






ASSESSING PERFORMANCE OF A PRIVATE HOSPITAL IN NEPAL: EVIDENCE 
FROM PABON LASSO AND REGRESSION MODELS 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 In developing countries, such as Nepal, many people believe the private (versus public) 
sector delivers better health care (Andaleeb, 2000). Indeed, the majority of health expenditures in 
Nepal come from private households (RTI International, 2010). This is consistent with a shift in 
the public-private mix of hospitals across time. For example, the share of private hospitals in Nepal 
increased from 23 to 78 percent since 1995. Moreover, the private sector now provides many 
services that were historically public, such as maternal and child care and infectious disease control 
(RTI International, 2010). Nevertheless, there is limited empirical evidence on the performance of 
private hospitals in Nepal, especially as related to management.3 This is despite the fact that 
evidence-based decision making is important for the efficient delivery of health care (Liang et al., 
2017). We address this gap in the literature by examining the relationship between management 
and performance using Grande International Hospital (GIH) as a case study.  
 Established in 2010 (and providing inpatient services since 2013), GIH is part of the large 
and growing share of private hospitals in Nepal. It is located in Kathmandu and offers multi-
specialty preventative and curative health care services. GIH complies with the Joint Commission 
International patient safety goals and, as such, has forged a new standard of care in Nepal in terms 
of improved sanitation, technology and accessibility. For example, compared to public hospitals 
where the use of new technology is lagging, GIH uses advanced sterilization techniques and a 
                                                 
3 There is evidence that management strategies affect hospital performance in other contexts (Gholipuri et al., 2013; 
Kalhor et al., 2014; Aij et al., 2015). For example, Gholipour et al. (2013) assess this relationship across gynecology 
teaching hospitals in Iran. They find that hospitals run by a board of trustees performed better [3]. 
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reverse osmosis water purification system (The Himalayan Times, 2017). Moreover, along with 
ten operating rooms and 50 critical care units, it has a four-dimensional cardiovascular ultrasound, 
digital broadband magnetic resonance system, bone densitometer and catheterization laboratory. 
In terms of accessibility, GIH has an emergency medical team to rescue patients from any part of 
the country with an air and road ambulance service. It also provides preventative care, a help desk 
for foreign-born patients (i.e. for help with insurance and paperwork) and free clinics for those 
who cannot afford health care. In 2016, Frost & Sullivan named GIH as ‘Hospital of the Year’ 
(Business360, n.d.). Given the importance of GIH to health and health care in Nepal, it is important 
to assess its performance and drivers thereof. Moreover, as a leading private hospital in Nepal, it 
is well-positioned to establish best practices for other private hospitals in the country and similar 
contexts. 
 Our objective is to examine the relationship between management and performance of 
private hospitals in Nepal using GIH as a case study. To do so, we compare the performance of 
GIH across five management strategies, ranging from January 2013 to August 2017. The strategies 
are summarized in Table 2.1. The first (S1) was an extreme case of Chief Executive Officer (CEO) 
duality where the CEO was the Chairperson of the board of directors and a major shareholder. 
Under the second and third management strategies (S2 and S3, respectively), GIH had an 
independent board. In both cases, the CEO was an outside contractor, however the S2 CEO had 
20 additional years of management experience compared to the S3 CEO. Under the fourth 
management strategy (S4), the Medical Director, who was also a member of the board, managed 
GIH without a CEO. Finally, under the fifth management strategy (S5), the CEO was independent 
from the board of directors as in S2 and S3. However, in this case, two CEOs shared the position, 
and both simultaneously managed other hospitals.  
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 We use a Pabon Lasso model to compare hospital performance under these very different 
strategies via bed occupancy rate (BOR), bed turnover rate (BTR) and average length of stay 
(ALOS) (Lasso, 1986). To complement this analysis, we estimate the effect of each strategy on 
LOS in a regression framework (Aij et al, 2015; Tripathi et al., 2016; Lotfi et al., 2014). Using this 
multifaceted approach, our goal is to support evidence-based decision making and best practices 
for private hospitals in Nepal and similar contexts. 
Table 2.1: Management Strategies 
Management 
Strategy 
Start Date End Date Description 
S1 January 3, 2013 April 1, 2014 
CEO duality; CEO was Chairperson of 
the board 
S2 April 1, 2014 June 30, 2014 
Independent board 
Outside CEO with 20 additional years 
of management experience compared to 
S3 
S3 July 15, 2014 April 25, 2015 
Independent board 
Outside CEO with 20 fewer years of 
management experience compared to 
S2 
S4 April 25, 2015 June 24, 2016 
GIH managed by Medical Director, 
who was also a member of the board 
S5 June 24, 2016 August 2, 2017 
Independent board 







 GIH provided us with inpatient data ranging from 2013 to 2017. To our knowledge, we are 
the only researchers who have access to these data, which contain information about the patient’s 
country of origin, age, gender, admit and discharge dates, treatment department, diagnosis and 
surgery procedure. The timeline also includes two external shocks: a major earthquake and a 
political blockade.4 
 To assess the performance of GIH across management strategies, we use a Pabon Lasso 
model to simultaneously analyze three indicators: BOR; BTR; and average LOS. This graphical 
approach has been used largely in developing countries such as Iran, Malawi and Philippines 
(Gholipuri et al., 2013; Kalhor et al., 2014; Aeenparast et al., 2015). For example, Kalhor et al. 
(2014) use a Pabon Lasso model to assess the performance of six public hospitals in Iran (Kalhor 
et al., 2014). According to Lasso (1986), researchers should compare across a homogenous group 
of hospitals since size may affect all three performance indicators (Lasso, 1986). Following this 
recommendation, we focus only on GIH and compare across the five management strategies.  
  In our model, BOR is represented on the x-axis and measures the percentage of beds 
filled during the strategy. The value is derived by taking the ratio of inpatient days and bed days 
available (i.e. number of hospital beds × number of days the strategy was in place). BTR is 
represented on the y-axis and measures the number of times each bed changes occupants. The 
value is derived by taking the ratio of the number of discharges during the strategy and the number 
                                                 
4 A blockade imposed by India impacted the transportation of supplies including medicine, fuel and equipment to 
Nepal, which made it difficult to provide quality health care [12].  
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of bed available, which is 200. The graph is divided into four quadrants where the borders are 
defined by average BOR and average BTR.5 The four quadrants are characterized as follows: 
• Quadrant I – low BOR and BTR, indicating underutilization of hospital resources; 
• Quadrant II – low BOR and high BTR; 
• Quadrant III – an ideal situation in which BOR and BTR are both high; 
• Quadrant IV –  high BOR and low BTR, representing longer hospital stays with limited 
changes in bed occupants. 
 In addition to BOR and BTR, we present average LOS in a separate bar graph. It measures 
how many days a patient spends in the hospital, on average.6 
 To complement the Pabon Lasso model, we estimate the effect of each management strategy 
on LOS in a regression framework as outlined in Equation 1. Y is LOS in days. βj captures the 
effect of management strategy Sj on LOS for j= [2, 3, 4, 5]. The base group is S1, however we 
explore alternate base groups in the Appendix C. X is a vector of controls for country of origin 
(i.e. native-born or not), dummy variables for age compared to the base group of 25 to 58, gender, 
whether the patient had surgery and treatment department compared to general surgery. We also 
control for the earthquake and political blockade, as well as time via dummy variables for month 
and year. α consists of parameters to be estimated and ε is the error term. We estimate Equation 1 
using Ordinary Least Squares. 
                                                 
5 Lasso (1986) cautions researchers about using means to create the quadrants when comparing across hospitals as 
they may be skewed by high BOR in single-specialty hospitals, such as psychiatric hospitals [9]. We argue this is 
not an issue in our work since we are comparing across management strategies in a single hospital. 
6 In variations of the Pabon Lasso model, average LOS can be represented by diagonal lines passing through the 
origin of the BOR/BTR graph (Kalhor et al., 2014). 
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𝑌 = ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑆𝑗
5
𝑗=2
+ 𝜶𝑿 + 𝜀        Equation 1 
 In both the Pabon Lasso and regression models, we focus on patients who stayed at GIH for 
less than or equal to 38 days (Appendix D) since this is the 99th percentile of LOS.7 While doing 
so, we drop 228 observations. The majority of these dropped observations were native-born (226) 
male (168) patients who were treated in the Orthopedics department (84) followed by Department 
of Neuro Sciences (37).  We also drop observations for whom there was an obvious data entry 
error (e.g. a 300-year-old individual) or missing key information (e.g. age, gender, treatment 
department). Our sample consists of 23,081 observations, of whom 22,698 are native-born and 
383 are foreign-born. We perform all analyses separately for these groups, as well as for the full 
sample of patients. It is important to distinguish between native-born and foreign-born patients 
because there are likely differences in the nature of care received. For example, foreign-born 
patients may be visiting Kathmandu and are more likely to seek emergency versus preventative 
care. 
2.3 Results 
2.3.1 Pabon Lasso Model 
 Figures 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 contain results of the Pabon Lasso model, which we use to compare 
BOR and BTR across management strategies. We find that, under S1, GIH was in Quadrant I for 
all patients. This is characterized by low BOR and BTR, indicating underutilization of hospital 
resources. BOR increased and BTR declined under S2. Specifically, GIH moved to Quadrant IV, 
which is characterized by longer hospital stays with limited changes in bed occupants. Under S3, 
                                                 
7 As a robustness check, we estimated Equation 1 with different censors on LOS. The narrative was unchanged. 
Results are available upon request. 
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GIH remained in Quadrant IV for native-born patients, but moved to Quadrant III for foreign-born 
patients. As described above, this is efficient with high BOR and BTR. Next, we find a reduction 
in BOR under S4, especially for foreign-born patients. Specifically, GIH moved to Quadrant II, 
which is demonstrative of “unnecessary hospitalization, an oversupply of beds or the use of beds 
for simply observing patients” (Tripathi et al., 2016). Finally, we find that GIH operated efficiently 
under S5, especially for native-born patients. BOR and BTR were both high, indicating fewer 
unused beds and unnecessary hospitalizations. 






























Bed Occupancy Rate (Percent)







Figure 2.2 BOR and BTR by Management Strategy – Foreign-Born Patients 
 
Figure 2.3 BOR and BTR by Management Strategy – Native-Born Patients 
 
 In addition to BOR and BTR, we consider how average LOS varies by management 
strategy in Figure 2.4. For native-born patients, it was lowest under S1 and highest under S3. For 
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Figure 2.4 Average LOS by Management Strategy – All, Foreign-Born and Native-Born Patients 
  
2.3.2 Regression Model 
 Table 2.2 contains selected Ordinary Least Squares estimates of Equation 1, by which we 
examine the relationship between management strategies and LOS in a multivariate framework 
(Appendix E contains the full regression results). Unlike the Pabon Lasso model, this approach 
allows us to control for other factors that affect LOS (i.e. patient characteristics, treatment 
department, earthquake, political blockade and time).  









Mean (Standard Deviation) 4.216 4.747 4.207 
 (4.801) (4.737) (4.802) 
Strategy 2 -4.801*** -3.786* -4.675*** 
 (1.506) (2.232) (1.541) 
Strategy 3 -3.783*** 0.0419 -3.681** 
 (1.436) (2.085) (1.472) 

































 (0.719) (2.020) (0.737) 
Table 2.2 Continued 
 
Strategy 5 -0.273 -2.613 -0.0845 




Age ≤ 5 -0.694*** -7.704*** -0.614*** 
 (0.193) (1.979) (0.193) 
6≤ Age ≤17 -0.720*** -2.832* -0.738*** 
 (0.112) (1.491) (0.113) 
18≤ Age ≤24 0.00418 1.879* -0.0366 
 (0.115) (1.032) (0.115) 
Age >58 1.258*** 1.994** 1.234*** 
 (0.0810) (0.770) (0.0815) 
Female -0.362*** 0.266 -0.369*** 
 (0.0666) (0.478) (0.0673) 
Surgery 0.157* 1.974*** 0.127 
 (0.0806) (0.697) (0.0813) 
Cardiology and Cardiac Surgery -1.283*** 1.697 -1.305*** 
 (0.146) (1.244) (0.148) 
Cardiothoracic and Vascular Surgery 0.957*** 1.958 0.993*** 
 (0.370) (1.665) (0.376) 
Critical Care Medicine 2.101*** 
– 
2.077*** 
 (0.240) (0.240) 
Dentistry and Dental Surgery 1.571** 7.436 1.306* 
 (0.750) (5.394) (0.733) 
Department of Neuro Sciences 2.661*** 5.386*** 2.634*** 
 (0.186) (1.464) (0.188) 
Ear, Nose, Throat, Head and Neck Surgery -1.539*** 2.181 -1.538*** 
 (0.103) (1.567) (0.103) 
Emergency Medicine -4.391*** 2.466 -4.085*** 
 (0.620) (1.523) (0.469) 
Endocrinology and Diabetology -0.0737 6.994*** -0.118 
 (0.236) (1.128) (0.235) 
Gastroenterology and Hepatology -0.312*** 1.272 -0.322*** 
 (0.121) (1.159) (0.122) 
Geriatric Medicine -1.457*** 
– 
-1.458*** 
 (0.217) (0.220) 
Infectious Diseases 2.670 
– 
2.648 
 (1.952) (1.949) 
Internal Medicine 0.446 1.473 0.843** 
 (0.333) (1.200) (0.379) 
Neonatal Critical Care 0.964* 
– 
0.850 
 (0.555) (0.558) 
Nephrology and Transplant Medicine 0.802*** 3.061** 0.781*** 
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 (0.152) (1.422) (0.153) 
Obstetrics and Gynecology -0.274*** 2.314* -0.327*** 




 (0.236) (0.236) 
Ophthalmology and Vision Sciences -2.286*** 
– 
-2.287*** 
 (0.324) (0.323) 
Orthopedics and Traumatology 1.430*** 2.458** 1.443*** 
 (0.124) (1.158) (0.126) 
Pediatrics and Neonatology 1.427*** 10.89*** 1.292*** 
 (0.196) (2.146) (0.195) 
Plastic, Reconstructive and Cosmetic Surgery 2.093*** 3.200 2.112*** 
 (0.571) (1.944) (0.588) 
Psychiatry 0.359 -1.690 0.340 
 (0.335) (2.315) (0.338) 
Pulmonary Medicine 0.968*** 2.544* 1.170*** 
 (0.323) (1.355) (0.350) 
Radiology and Interventions -2.493*** 
– 
-2.488*** 
 (0.174) (0.179) 
Urology and Kidney Transplant Surgery -0.979*** 0.956 -0.978*** 




 (0.622) (0.623) 
Political Blockade -0.344 2.456 -0.370 
 (0.316) (3.752) (0.318) 
N 23,081 383 22,698 
R-Squared 0.089 0.358 0.090 
We also control for time via dummy variables for month and year. Robust standard errors are 
reported in parentheses unless otherwise indicated. Statistical significance is given by: * ten 
percent; ** five percent; and *** one percent.  
 
 Compared to the base group of S1, S2 had the lowest LOS.8 For example, being treated under 
S2 reduced LOS by 4.8 days, on average. The effect is slightly larger for native-born versus 
foreign-born patients. Interestingly, LOS was also shorter under S3 compared to S1 for native-
born patients (i.e. 3.7 days), but there was no effect on foreign-born patients. On the other hand, 
LOS was shorter under S4 versus S1 for foreign-born patients (i.e. 3.4 days), but there was no 
                                                 
8 The Appendix C contains estimates with alternate base groups, and the narrative is largely unchanged. For 
example, compared to the base group of S2, LOS is longer under all other strategies. 
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effect on native-born patients. The difference between S5 and S1 is not statistically significant, 
regardless of patient group.  
 In terms of control variables, Table 2.2 indicates that children and youth (i.e. those younger 
than 18) stayed in the hospital for fewer days compared to those aged 25 to 58. On the other hand, 
LOS is 1.25 days longer for older patients, on average. We also find that LOS is marginally shorter 
for females and longer for individuals who had surgery. Moreover, patients in the following 
departments had a shorter LOS compared to general surgery: Cardiology and Cardiac Surgery; 
Ear, Nose, Throat, Head and Neck Surgery; Emergency Medicine; Gastroenterology and 
Hepatology; Geriatric Medicine; Obstetrics and Gynecology; Ophthalmology and Vision 
Sciences; Radiology and Interventions; Urology and Kidney Transplant Surgery. Conversely, LOS 
is longer for patients in: Cardiothoracic and Vascular Surgery; Critical Care Medicine; Dentistry 
and Dental Surgery; Department of Neuro Sciences; Neonatal Critical Care; Nephrology and 
Transplant Medicine; Orthopedics and Traumatology; Pediatrics and Neonatology; Plastic, 
Reconstructive and Cosmetic Surgery; and Pulmonary Medicine. Finally, coefficients related to 
the earthquake and political blockade are not statistically significant, but remain in the analysis 
because, if omitted, may bias coefficients on management strategies (i.e. these events are plausibly 
related to both management strategies and LOS). 
2.4 Discussion 
2.4.1 Statement and Interpretation of Principal Findings 
 
 Health care has been changing in Nepal, with a large and growing share of private hospitals 
(RTI International, 2010). Yet, there is limited empirical evidence on the relationship between 
management and performance of these organizations. We address this gap in the literature using 
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GIH as a case study. Our goal is to support evidence-based decision making and best practices for 
private hospitals in Nepal and similar contexts.  
 Using a Pabon Lasso model, we find that BOR and BTR were low under S1 (i.e. CEO 
duality), perhaps reflecting the challenges of starting inpatient services. Under S2, in which the 
board was independent from an experienced CEO, GIH had a high BOR and low BTR. However, 
with a less experienced CEO under S3, GIH performed better for foreign-born patients. This may 
be attributed to surrogate mothers from India, a large number of whom came to GIH for labor and 
delivery and then were discharged during this period. Under S4, during which GIH was managed 
by the Medical Director, it experienced low BOR and high BTR. This is likely due to the major 
earthquake and political blockade that occurred during the period (e.g. GIH was unable keep 
adequate records during the earthquake, which could mirror “unnecessary hospitalization” and an 
“oversupply of beds”). Finally, we find that GIH performed best under S5, during which there 
were two CEOs who were independent from the board of directors. This is consistent with evidence 
that autonomy allows for expedient decision-making in allocating resources (Gholipuri et al., 
2013). However, it is important to note that, while GIH faced challenges under other strategies 
(i.e. first year of inpatient services, earthquake, political blockade), it did not under S5. These 
differences cannot be addressed in the Pabon Lasso model. Given this limitation, we compare 
findings from the Pabon Lasso model to those of a regression analysis, in which we control for 
other factors that affect hospital performance. We find that LOS was lowest under S2. This is 
inconsistent with the Pabon Lasso model, which suggests it was lowest under S1 for native-born 
patients and S5 for foreign-born patients.  
 Taken together, our results suggest important differences in hospital performance by 
indicator (i.e. BOR, BTR versus LOS), patient type (i.e. native-born versus foreign-born) and 
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analytical approach. In terms of the latter, both models are consistent with agency theory, which 
suggests that separation between the CEO and board promotes better performance. However, 
results from the Pabon Lasso model also support stewardship theory, which suggests that CEO 
duality is essential to “unify and to remove ambiguity from firm leadership” (Ramdani et al., 2010). 
We argue that, when it comes to evaluating management strategies, private hospitals in Nepal and 
similar contexts should consider evidence from more than one analytical approach, as well as 
important differences by performance indicator and patient type. 
2.5 Strengths and Weaknesses 
 A strength of this work is that we use unique data (to our knowledge, we are the only 
researchers with access) to inform an issue that is not well-understood. This is important for the 
efficient delivery of health care in Nepal and other developing countries where private hospitals 
are increasingly influential. Another strength is that we consider contextual differences (e.g. 
native-born versus foreign-born) and use more than one analytical approach. The latter is important 
because we cannot control for confounding factors in the Pabon Lasso model. In other words, the 
Pabon Lasso model is useful for describing differences, but we cannot infer whether they are 
attributable to management strategies or coinciding factors (e.g. patient characteristics, time, 
earthquake, political blockade). This is possible, to some extent, in the regression analysis. 
Nevertheless, our results are correlational and should be interpreted as such. 
 In terms of weaknesses, we cannot assess quality of care and are missing data related to 
costs, readmissions and deaths. The latter are required for data envelopment analysis, which is a 
more common approach to assessing hospital performance; it is used by 48 percent of studies 
(Hollingsworth, 2008). This technique would allow us to understand the “complex nature of the 
relations between the multiple inputs and multiple outputs involved in many activities” (Cooper et 
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al., 2007). Also, the inclusion of financial metrics might change our conclusion on the best strategy 
for the hospital. For example, length of stay for foreign-born patients and native-born patients 
would affect hospital income differently. Perhaps, for financial advantage, the hospital might target 
certain patient-types based on a profit motive. Specially, medical tourism has gained popularity in 
recent years, researchers should be aware of the impact of medical tourism, financial gain received 
from medical services to foreign-born patients and length of stay (British Broadcasting 
Corporation, 2010). However, in the absence of financial metrics, we refer to past Lasso studies 
and make appropriate conclusions solely based on BOR and BTR (Gholipuri et al., 2013; Kalhor 
et al., 2014; Aeenparast et al., 2015). Also, we our sample size for foreign-born patients is very 
low compared to native-born patients which bias our regression results. Another limitation is that 
we are missing inpatient data due to the earthquake. This distorts our results. For example, GIH 
had a low BOR under S4, but the reality was likely quite different. Finally, our analysis pertains 
to inpatients at a leading hospital in Kathmandu, Nepal. Readers should keep this in mind when 
generalizing results to other patient groups (e.g. outpatients), in less established hospitals, more 
rural areas and/or other developing countries.  
2.6 Meaning and Future Research 
 Our results indicate that separation between the CEO and board may promote better 
performance (except the Pabon Lasso model favors CEO duality under S1 for average LOS among 
native-born patients). Perhaps more importantly, we provide evidence that more than one 
analytical approach should be used to assess hospital performance. For example, although the 
Pabon Lasso model is useful for describing differences, we cannot infer whether they are 
attributable to management strategies or coinciding factors. This is addressed by the regression 
analysis, to some extent, and hospitals might consider collecting data on confounding factors (i.e. 
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those that are related to both hospital management and performance) and other missing information 
described above. They might also consider standardization (e.g. current procedural terminology) 
to enhance the external validity of the analysis.  
2.7 Conclusion 
 The importance of private hospitals in Nepal and other developing countries has been 
growing in recent years. However, there is limited empirical evidence on their performance, 
especially as related to management. Our results indicate that separation between the CEO and 
board may promote better performance, but there is variation by indicator (i.e. BOR, BTR versus 
LOS), patient type (i.e. native-born versus foreign-born) and analytical approach. We argue that, 
when it comes to evaluating management strategies, private hospitals in Nepal and similar contexts 
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APPENDIX A  





Districti sdist Control District=0 and Treatment District=1  
Posti - Pre-policy=0 and Post-Policy=1 
Districti × Posti - Interaction between Districti × Posti 
Mountain sreg Mountain=1 if sreg=1, Mountain==0 otherwise 
Hill sreg Hill=1 if sreg=2, Hill==0 otherwise 
Terai  sreg Terai=1 if sreg=3, Terai==0 otherwise 
Age v012 v012 
Age2 v012 (v012) ×(v012) 
Wealth Index:Poor v190 Poor=1 if v190==1 | v190==2, Poor==0 otherwise 
Wealth Index:Middle v190 Middle=1 if v190==3, Middle==0 otherwise 
Wealth Index:Rich v190 Rich=1 if v190==4 | v190==5, Rich==0 otherwise 
Unemployed v717 Unemployed=1 if v717==0 , Unemployed==0 otherwise 
Agriculture v717 Agriculture=1 if v717==4, Agriculture==0 otherwise 
Non-Ag Work v717 Non-Ag Work=1 if v717==1 | v717==2| v717==3 | v717==5| 
v717==6 | v717==7| v717==8 | v717==9| v717==10,  Non-Ag 
Work==0 otherwise 
No Education V149 No Education=1 if V149==0, No Education==0 otherwise 
Some Primary V149 Some Primary=1 if V149==1, Some Primary==0 otherwise 
Complete Primary V149 Complete Primary=1 if V149==2 | V149==3, Complete 
Primary==0 otherwise 
Secondary V149 Secondary=1 if V149==3, Secondary==0 otherwise 
Rural v025 Rural=1 if v025==2, Rural==0 otherwise 
Brahmin v131 Brahmin=1 if v131==2 | v131==27, Brahmin==0 otherwise 
Chhetri v131 Chhetri=1 if v131==1|v131==14|v131==20| 
v131==48|v131==51|v131==73, Chhetri==0 otherwise 
Dalit v131 Dalit=1 if  v131==8|v131==12|v131==15|v131==17 
|v131==22|v131==23| v131==54|v131==75|v131==79| 
v131==84|v131==39|v131==40|v131==41, Dalit==0 otherwise 
Newar  v131 Newar=1 if v131==6, Newar==0 otherwise 
Janjati v131 Janjati=1 if v131==3| v131==4|v131==5|v131==10 |v131==11 
|v131==13 |v131==1 |v131==21 |v131==24 |v131==29 
|v131==45 |v131==46 |v131==52 |v131==61  
|v131==62 |v131==67 |v131==86 |v131==32 |v131==35 
|v131==36 |v131==42, Janjati==0 otherwise 
Muslim v131 Muslim=1 if v131==7, Muslim==0 otherwise 
Teraimadh v131 Teraimadh=1 if v131== 9 |v131==18 |v131==19 |v131==25 
|v131==26 |v131==28 |v131==30 |v131==31 | 
v131==33 |v131==34 |v131==37 |v131==38 |v131==43 
|v131==44 |v131==47 |v131==50 |v131==55 |v131==56 
|v131==58 |v131==59 |v131==64 |v131==72 |v131==76 
56 
 
|v131==90 |v131==91, Teraimadh==0 otherwise 
Non-Hindu v130 Non-hindu=1 if v130==2 | v130==3 | v130==4 | v130==5, Non-
Hindu==0 otherwise 
Hindu v130 Hindu=1 if v130 ==1, Hindu==0 otherwise 
Birth order Bord Bord 
No Read v155 No Read=1 if v155==0, No read==0 otherwise 
Some Read v155 Some Read=1 if v155==1, Some Read==0 otherwise 
Read v155 Read=1 if v155==2, Read==0 otherwise 
Radio v120 Radio=1 if v120==1 | v158==1 | v384a==1 | s1010aa==1 | 
s1010ad==1, Radio==0 otherwise 
Fathers_No 
Education 








v729 Fathers_Complete Primary=1 if v729==2 | v729==3, 
Fathers_Complete Primary==0 otherwise 
Fathers_Secondary v729 Fathers_Secondary=1 if v729==3, Fathers_Secondary==0 
otherwise 
 
List of treatment districts: Mugu; Bajura; Kalikot; Bajhang; Jajarkot; Jumla; Achham; Humla; 
Dolpa; Dailekh; Rolpa; Rukum; Baitadi; Rasuwa; Salyan; Doti; Mahottari; Sarlahi; Rautahat; 





APPENDIX B  
T-TEST FOR PERCENTAGE DIFFERENCES IN OUTCOME VARIABLES BETWEEN 
CONTROL AND TREATMENT, PRE AND POST SDIP 
 
Table: Percentage point difference in outcome variables for each subgroup. Standard errors are 
reported in parentheses unless otherwise indicated. Statistical significance is given by: * ten 




  -3.3066*** 
(1.4537)   















  22.1983*** 
(3.8872)   














Prenatal care from a doctor 
 
  1.3104 
(2.1049)   





















Prenatal care from a nurse/midwife  
 
  23.3822*** 
(3.2349)   













Number of tetanus vaccinations 
 
 
  15.1513*** 
(3.9293)   















APPENDIX C  
ORDINARY LEAST SQUARES ESTIMATES OF LOS WITH ALTERNATE BASE 
GROUPS – ALL PATIENTS 
 
 Base Group 
 Strategy 1 Strategy 2 Strategy 3 Strategy 4 Strategy 5 
Strategy 1 
– 
4.801*** 3.783*** 0.715 0.273 
 (1.506) (1.436) (0.719) (0.851) 
Strategy 2 -4.801*** 
– 
-1.018** -4.086*** -4.528*** 
 (1.506) (0.451) (1.325) (1.401) 
Strategy 3 -3.783*** 1.018** 
– 
-3.067** -3.510*** 
 (1.436) (0.451) (1.245) (1.325) 
Strategy 4 -0.715 4.086*** 3.067** 
– 
-0.442 
 (0.719) (1.325) (1.245) (0.455) 
Strategy 5 -0.273 4.528*** 3.510*** 0.442 
– 
 (0.851) (1.401) (1.325) (0.455) 
N 23,081 23,081 23,081 23,081 23,081 
R-Squared 0.089 0.089 0.089 0.089 0.089 
We include all relevant control variables. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
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kernel = epanechnikov, bandwidth = 0.3571
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APPENDIX E  
FULL TABLE FOR ORDINARY LEAST SQUARES ESTIMATES OF LOS – ALL, 
FOREIGN-BORN AND NATIVE-BORN PATIENTS 
 
 All-Patients Foreign-Born Native-Born 
Strategy 2 -4.801*** -3.786* -4.675*** 
 (1.506) (2.232) (1.541) 
Strategy 3 -3.783*** 0.0419 -3.681** 
 (1.436) (2.085) (1.472) 
Strategy 4 -0.715 -3.383* -0.540 
 (0.719) (2.020) (0.737) 
Strategy 5 -0.273 -2.613 -0.0845 
 (0.851) (2.364) (0.868) 
Native-Born -0.694*** -7.704*** -0.614*** 
 (0.193) (1.979) (0.193) 
Age ≤ 5 -0.720*** -2.832* -0.738*** 
 (0.112) (1.491) (0.113) 
6≤ Age ≤17 0.00418 1.879* -0.0366 
 (0.115) (1.032) (0.115) 
18≤ Age ≤24 1.258*** 1.994** 1.234*** 
 (0.0810) (0.770) (0.0815) 
Age >58 -0.224   
 (0.245)   
Female -0.362*** 0.266 -0.369*** 
 (0.0666) (0.478) (0.0673) 
Surgery 0.157* 1.974*** 0.127 
 (0.0806) (0.697) (0.0813) 
Cardiology and Cardiac Surgery -1.283*** 1.697 -1.305*** 
 (0.146) (1.244) (0.148) 
Cardiothoracic and Vascular Surgery 0.957*** 1.958 0.993*** 
 (0.370) (1.665) (0.376) 
Critical Care Medicine 2.101***  2.077*** 
 (0.240)  (0.240) 
Dentistry and Dental Surgery 1.571** 7.436 1.306* 
 (0.750) (5.394) (0.733) 
Department of Neuro Sciences 2.661*** 5.386*** 2.634*** 
 (0.186) (1.464) (0.188) 
Ear, Nose, Throat, Head and Neck Surgery -1.539*** 2.181 -1.538*** 
 (0.103) (1.567) (0.103) 
Emergency Medicine -4.391*** 2.466 -4.085*** 
 (0.620) (1.523) (0.469) 
Endocrinology and Diabetology -0.0737 6.994*** -0.118 
 (0.236) (1.128) (0.235) 
Gastroenterology and Hepatology -0.312*** 1.272 -0.322*** 
 (0.121) (1.159) (0.122) 
Geriatric Medicine -1.457***  -1.458*** 
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 (0.217)  (0.220) 
Infectious Diseases 2.670  2.648 
 (1.952)  (1.949) 
Internal Medicine 0.446 1.473 0.843** 
 (0.333) (1.200) (0.379) 
Neonatal Critical Care 0.964*  0.850 
 (0.555)  (0.558) 
Nephrology and Transplant Medicine 0.802*** 3.061** 0.781*** 
 (0.152) (1.422) (0.153) 
Obstetrics and Gynecology -0.274*** 2.314* -0.327*** 
 (0.101) (1.250) (0.100) 
Oncology -0.215  -0.226 
 (0.236)  (0.236) 
Ophthalmology and Vision Sciences -2.286***  -2.287*** 
 (0.324)  (0.323) 
Orthopedics and Traumatology 1.430*** 2.458** 1.443*** 
 (0.124) (1.158) (0.126) 
Pediatrics and Neonatology 1.427*** 10.89*** 1.292*** 
 (0.196) (2.146) (0.195) 
Plastic, Reconstructive and Cosmetic Surgery 2.093*** 3.200 2.112*** 
 (0.571) (1.944) (0.588) 
Psychiatry 0.359 -1.690 0.340 
 (0.335) (2.315) (0.338) 
Pulmonary Medicine 0.968*** 2.544* 1.170*** 
 (0.323) (1.355) (0.350) 
Radiology and Interventions -2.493***  -2.488*** 
 (0.174)  (0.179) 
Urology and Kidney Transplant Surgery -0.979*** 0.956 -0.978*** 
 (0.103) (1.734) (0.104) 
January /2013 -3.343***  -3.304*** 
 (0.447)  (0.447) 
February /2013 -1.900***  -1.858*** 
 (0.433)  (0.435) 
March /2013 -2.079***  -2.035*** 
 (0.382)  (0.383) 
April /2013 -0.609  -0.562 
 (0.451)  (0.452) 
May /2013 -0.935*** -1.375 -0.873** 
 (0.362) (2.091) (0.365) 
June /2013 -0.656*  -0.603* 
 (0.345)  (0.346) 
July /2013 -0.322  -0.273 
 (0.381)  (0.382) 
August /2013 -0.132  -0.0809 
 (0.344)  (0.345) 
September /2013 -0.729** -1.736 -0.664** 
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 (0.332) (1.982) (0.334) 
October /2013 -0.635* -1.982 -0.564 
 (0.353) (2.120) (0.357) 
November /2013 -0.0948 -3.157 0.000203 
 (0.417) (2.462) (0.422) 
December /2013 -0.691** 8.561 -0.740** 
 (0.311) (6.217) (0.304) 
January /2014 -0.0595 1.482 -0.179 
 (0.352) (3.044) (0.339) 
February /2014 0.0497 -0.919 0.0145 
 (0.367) (2.191) (0.372) 
March /2014 - - - 
    
April /2014 4.594*** 3.714** 4.440*** 
 (1.501) (1.853) (1.536) 
May /2014 4.718*** 4.505*** 4.608*** 
 (1.511) (1.529) (1.546) 
June /2014 4.851*** -0.313 4.797*** 
 (1.509) (1.419) (1.544) 
July /2014 4.058*** -1.297 4.013*** 
 (1.465) (1.085) (1.501) 
August /2014 3.460** 1.357 3.383** 
 (1.427) (3.258) (1.462) 
September /2014 3.608** -3.101** 3.583** 
 (1.434) (1.464) (1.468) 
October /2014 4.489*** -0.0922 4.434*** 
 (1.442) (1.356) (1.479) 
November /2014 4.522*** -0.745 4.509*** 
 (1.434) (1.156) (1.470) 
December /2014 3.396** -1.482 3.320** 
 (1.425) (1.185) (1.460) 
January /2015 3.611** -2.173 3.563** 
 (1.432) (1.329) (1.468) 
February /2015 3.503** -1.238 3.446** 
 (1.442) (1.578) (1.477) 
March /2015 4.498*** 0.471 4.409*** 
 (1.452) (1.810) (1.488) 
April /2015 3.194**  3.086** 
 (1.401)  (1.437) 
May /2015 1.973** 2.381 1.872* 
 (0.972) (1.985) (0.986) 
June /2015 0.741 3.085 0.622 
 (0.946) (2.507) (0.961) 
July /2015 0.756 3.434 0.633 
 (0.889) (2.372) (0.903) 
August /2015 0.450 4.167** 0.309 
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 (0.724) (1.840) (0.742) 
September /2015 0.204 2.967 0.0988 
 (0.766) (4.401) (0.783) 
October /2015 5.833*** 2.408 6.133*** 
 (1.630) (4.200) (1.785) 
November /2015 1.457* 2.289 1.339 
 (0.809) (4.654) (0.826) 
December /2015 0.753 -0.584 0.669 
 (0.783) (3.919) (0.801) 
January /2016 1.433* 1.318 1.340* 
 (0.783) (4.184) (0.800) 
February /2016 0.992 1.101 0.895 
 (0.745) (2.810) (0.763) 
March /2016 0.281 5.243** 0.109 
 (0.705) (2.565) (0.723) 
April /2016 -0.00547 1.738 -0.121 
 (0.699) (1.088) (0.719) 
May /2016 0.965 3.407* 0.824 
 (0.712) (1.978) (0.731) 
June /2016 0.553 2.425** 0.429 
 (0.709) (1.150) (0.727) 
July /2016 0.0359 2.146 -0.0913 
 (0.834) (1.849) (0.851) 
August /2016 0.197 2.193 0.0562 
 (0.833) (1.938) (0.850) 
September /2016 0.0351 1.209 -0.0931 
 (0.834) (1.568) (0.852) 
October /2016 0.118 0.961 0.00899 
 (0.835) (1.626) (0.853) 
November /2016 -0.0295 0.438 -0.152 
 (0.831) (1.664) (0.848) 
December /2016 0.404 0.703 0.290 
 (0.842) (1.797) (0.860) 
January /2017 0.212 1.902 0.0783 
 (0.841) (1.723) (0.859) 
February /2017 0.371 0.804 0.249 
 (0.837) (1.555) (0.855) 
March /2017 0.0709 0.607 -0.0554 
 (0.833) (2.029) (0.850) 
April /2017 -0.227 -0.282 -0.339 
 (0.830) (1.520) (0.848) 
May /2017 -0.205 1.092 -0.336 
 (0.831) (1.799) (0.849) 
June /2017 -1.319 -0.767 -1.411* 
 (0.829) (1.565) (0.847) 
Political Blockade  -0.344 2.456 -0.370 
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 (0.316) (3.752) (0.318) 
Earthquake -0.543  -0.547 
 (0.622)  (0.623) 
Constant 4.161*** 1.651 3.928*** 
 (0.351) (2.041) (0.257) 
Observations 23,081 383 22,698 
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